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The Territorial and District Representation Amendment:
A Proposal
Colin P.A. Jones*

E XECUTIVE S UMMARY
This article will propose and explain a draft amendment to the United
States Constitution that would secure an intermediate degree of political
representation for Americans living in U.S. territories. While concerned
principally with U.S. territories, the amendment would also address
Congressional representation for the District of Columbia.

I. I NTRODUCTION
The U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, The U.S. Virgin Islands,
American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
(CNMI) exist in an alternate dimension of constitutionality. Some of the
structure of this alternate reality comes from the U.S. Constitution itself—
its allocation of political representation in Congress and the electoral
college to states only, leaving nothing for U.S. citizens living in
territories.1 However, it has been further developed through Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the mystifyingly optional applicability of the
Constitution in U.S. territories, including in particular the so-called Insular
Cases, a series of cases that for the most part remain “good law” today,
embarrassingly so, given their racist and colonial foundations.2
The purpose of this article is not to revisit the Insular Cases, a subject
which has been dissected in great detail in over a century’s worth of books
and law review articles, or to further decry the depressing lack of
democratic participation in national governance accorded to U.S. citizens
* LL.M. Tohoku University, J.D./LL.M. Duke Law School; Life Member, Clare Hall,
University of Cambridge; Professor, Doshisha Law School (Kyoto, Japan), Member, Guam Bar
Association. Also admitted to practice in New York and the Republic of Palau.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; id. art. II, § 1.
2. There are various views on the subject of exactly which Supreme Court decisions constitute
a part of the Insular Case canon, but for purposes of this article the following description should
suffice: “A series of cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1901 and 1922 interpreting
Congress’s power under the Territorial Clause.” Lisa M. Kömives, Enfranchising a Discrete and
Insular Minority: Extending Federal Voting Rights to American Citizens Living in United States
Territories, 36 U. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 115, 117 n.4 (2004).
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and nationals living in U.S. territories.3 The sole purpose of this article will
be to propose a “simple” and practical solution to just the latter problem:
the lack of meaningful federal voting rights for U.S. territories.
The proposed solution is a constitutional amendment. As a law
professor who actually lives in a U.S. territory (Guam), the author has a
personal interest in generating real world remedial actions as opposed to
additional contemplative scholarship on the subject. Accordingly, the text
of a pragmatic draft amendment—entitled the “Territorial and District
Representation Amendment” or “TRDA”—is proposed below and an
explanation of the rationale behind the language of the amendment
follows.
The proposed amendment is “simple” in that it would do nothing more
than constitutionalize the Congressional representation already accorded
to the territories by federal law.4 The non-voting delegates currently
elected to the House of Representatives by territories would be converted
to voting members who participate fully in the activities of that chamber.5
3. In the interests of sparing both editors and readers the traditional citation attempting to list
every work ever published on a subject, the author hopes a few cites to book-length works on the
subject will be adequate to support the propositions contained in this paragraph. See, e.g., JUAN R.
TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL
(1985); BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN
EMPIRE (2006); GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE (2004); SAM
ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND EMPIRE (2019); Geoffrey
Wyatt & Neil Weare, Ongoing Denial of Voting Rights in U.S. Territories Incompatible With Our
Founding Values, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS – CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW (Oct. 3, 2018), available at:
https://harvardcrcl.org/ongoing-denial-of-voting-rights-in-u-s-territories-incompatible-with-ourfounding-values/. The author’s own small but recent contribution to the literature is also noted: Colin
P.A. Jones, The Islands that Ate the Constitution, 42 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 51 (2021). The author has
also used a recent book review to point out the likely relationship between the Insular Cases (Reid v.
Covert, in particular) and the introduction of civil, criminal and grand juries in U.S.-occupied and
administered Okinawa. Colin P.A. Jones, Civil Juries in Okinawa’s Past and Japan’s Future, 8 ASIAN
J.L. & SOC’Y 183 (2021) (reviewing OSAMU NIIKURA, SATORU SHINOMIYA, HIROSHI FUKURAI
& TAKAYUKI II TOKYO, CIVIL JURY TRIALS COULD CHANGE JAPAN [MINJI BAISHIN SAIBAN GA
NIHON WO KAERU] (2020)); Reid. v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
4. 48 U.S.C. § 1711 (“The territory of Guam and the territory of the Virgin Islands each shall
be represented in the United States Congress by a nonvoting Delegate to the House of
Representatives…”); 48 U.S.C. § 1731 (“The Territory of American Samoa shall be represented in the
United States Congress by a nonvoting Delegate to the House of Representatives…”); 48 U.S.C.
§ 1751 (“The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands shall be represented in the United States
Congress by the Resident Representative to the United States authorized by section 901 of the
Covenant To Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union With the
United States of America [citation omitted]. The Resident Representative shall be a nonvoting
Delegate to the House of Representatives, elected as provided in this subchapter.”); 48 U.S.C. § 891
(“The qualified electors of Puerto Rico shall choose a Resident Commissioner to the United States at
each general election…”)
5. Acknowledging that the formal title of Puerto Rico’s representative in Congress is
“Resident Commissioner,” for simplicity, this article refers to all territorial representatives under
existing law as “delegates.”
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Electoral college votes (electors) would also be allocated to the territories
in essentially the same manner as they are to States under the Constitution;
one for each member of Congress. Territories would differ from states in
that each would only have a single elector, due to the absence of senate
representation and having only a single representative in the House
regardless of population, as is currently the case. This may seem
inequitable, but the amendment has modest goals: to constitutionalize
what already exists.
With this amendment, territories would obtain at least partial
constitutional representation in the federal law-making process. They
would also participate in choosing the president, a basic democratic right
the people of U.S. territories are currently denied. Territories would not be
represented in the Senate but such representation can be achieved by
advancing to statehood, at least for those territories with a population
sufficient to be viable for full membership in the union.
Under the TDRA, territories would remain subject to the plenary
powers of Congress under Article IV, Section 3. The trade-off for this
would be that they would retain the special rules on taxation, land tenure
and local political representation that are possible through those plenary
powers, and which would be incompatible with full statehood.6 This is not
stated in the text of the amendment, but should be implicit from the limited
scope of changes it seeks to achieve.
Although primarily directed at territorial representation, the
amendment also seeks to address the democratic deficit suffered by the
people of the District of Columbia.7 It does so through the same simple
mechanism: constitutionalizing the Congressional representation currently
accorded to the District by federal law. 8 The principal difference is that
the District already participates in presidential elections through the
Twenty-third Amendment, so no changes are needed in that respect.
The amendment does not address the comparative lack of
representation in Congress or the number of electoral college votes that
would be accorded to Puerto Rico compared to states with a comparable
6. For a discussion of some of these special rules, see, for example, Jones, The Islands that
Ate the Constitution, supra note 3, as well as other articles in this volume.
7. The constitutionality of the lack of Congressional representation was recently upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Castañon v. United States [citation pending]. See also, Andrew Beaujon,
Supreme Court Rules That DC Should Not Have Voting Rights in Congress, WASHINGTONIAN (Oct.
4, 2021), available at: https://www.washingtonian.com/2021/10/04/supreme-court-rules-that-dcshould-not-have-voting-rights-in-congress/.
8. 2 U.S.C § 25a(a) (“The people of the District of Columbia shall be represented in the House
of Representatives by a Delegate…The Delegate shall have a seat in the House of Representatives,
with the right of debate, but not of voting).

177

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 36

population. Under current law, the District of Columbia and each territory
has a single representative (delegate), and the amendment would not
change this.9 This proposal assumes the ultimate solution to such inequity
is statehood. As to Washington, D.C., this article assumes that its path to
statehood is rendered more difficult by the existence of Article I, Section
8 Clause 17 and the likely need for a separate constitutional amendment
(though it is acknowledged there are various views on this subject).
Nevertheless, since D.C. statehood is a subject beyond the scope of the
proposed amendment, it is not discussed further.10

II. T HE TERRITORIAL AND D ISTRICT R EPRESENTATION
A MENDMENT
The text of the proposed amendment is set forth below. A clause-byclause explanation of the underlying rationale for specific text follows.

THE TERRITORIAL AND DISTRICT REPRESENTATION
AMENDMENT
Section 1.
(1) The United States Territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, American
Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, and any future Territory of the United
States having a population of at least 30,000 people and for which
Congress has constituted a government, and the District
constituting the seat of government of the United States shall each
have one Member in the House of Representatives, who shall be
additional to those Representatives apportioned to the States.
Representatives elected from the Territories and the District shall
have all the privileges, immunities and duties of a Representative
under this Constitution, federal laws and the rules of the House of
Representatives.
(2) No Person shall be a Representative under the preceding section
who shall have not have attained the Age of twenty five years,

9. 48 U.S.C. § 1711; 2 U.S.C § 25a(a); supra note 4 and note 8.
10. In any case, at current population levels the District would be entitled to only a single
member in the House of Representatives even if it were a state.
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been seven years a citizen of the United States (or, in the case of
the Representative for American Samoa, a national owing
allegiance to the United States) and, when elected, been a lawful
Inhabitant of the Territory or District in which they will be chosen.
Nor shall a Representative hold other paid public office or, on the
date of their election, be a candidate for other public office. No
territorial government shall impose additional requirements on
eligibility for its Representative, nor shall Congress impose any
such additional requirements on the Representative of any
Territory or the District.

(3) The people of each Territory and the District shall choose their
Representative every second year.
(4) Those eligible to vote for Representative in each Territory shall
have the qualifications established by their territorial legislatures,
but no person shall be disqualified from voting for the
Representative from their Territory on grounds of heritage, birth,
or manner of acquisition of United States citizenship or
nationality. When vacancies happen in the Representation from
any Territory, the executive authority thereof shall issue Writs of
Election to fill such Vacancies.
(5) Those eligible to vote for Representative in the District shall have
the qualifications provided by Congress, and vacancies in the
Representation from the District shall be filled by election
pursuant to rules established by Congress.
Section 2.
The voters of each Territory qualified to vote for their
Representatives shall also appoint, in such manner as the
Legislature of the Territory may direct, one elector of President
and Vice President; these electors shall be in addition to those
appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the
purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be
electors appointed by a State, and shall perform such duties as
provided
by
the
twelfth
article
of
amendment.
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Section 3.
A Territory that ceases to be a Territory of the United States for
any reason other than its admission as a State shall immediately
cease to have a Representative in Congress.
Section 4.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.

III. E XPLANATORY R EMARKS
A. Overall Approach
For the sake of consistency, existing constitutional language and
conventions (such as capitalization of “Representative”) has been
replicated as much as possible, with particular attention to the provisions
of Article I, Section 2 and the Twenty-third Amendment. Existing
Congressional legislation establishing territorial delegates has also been
referenced for language and content. One exception to the effort at
consistency is the use of the term “voter” rather than “elector” to describe
persons participating in general elections by voting. This has been done to
avoid the confusing overlap with the term “Elector” as used in connection
with the process of selecting a President and Vice-President. Another
departure from earlier constitutional language is the use of
“they/them/their” in place of “he/him/his.”
The TRDA contains several provisions limiting Congressional
authority. At first glance these may seem unnecessary, but recall the
underlying presumption of the Territorial Clause and the Insular Cases
and their progeny is that Congress will continue to have plenary powers
over the territories.11 This is an oversimplification of the current
jurisprudence, but for constitutional drafting purposes the safe assumption
is that Congress can do anything to the Territories that is not clearly
prohibited by the Constitution.
Moreover, given that unlike States, territorial governments are the
creation of Congress or, in the case of American Samoa, the executive
11. See, e.g., United States v. Lebrón-Caceres, 157 F. Supp. 3d 80, 96–97 (D.P.R. 2016).
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branch, it seems prudent to include protections against the possibility of
undue federal interference in territorial electoral processes. This includes
indirect “permissive” actions, such as allowing territorial governments to
impose conditions on the exercise of political rights that would be
impermissible if done by state governments.
B. Section 1
Section 1 establishes that each existing territory and the District of
Columbia shall have one representative in the House of Representatives.
Since the goal is to constitutionalize what already exists, it makes it clear
that these Representatives are in addition to those allocated to the states.
This is also to prevent the possibility of states losing Representatives to
territories from being used as grounds for political opposition to the
amendment.
Each territory is identified by name, but in light of the Constitution’s
longevity it also anticipates the admittedly remote12 possibility of further
territorial acquisitions by the United States. No future Americans should
have to wait for another constitutional amendment to secure basic political
rights. The 30,000 population threshold in paragraph (1) is somewhat
arbitrary but intended to establish something close in size to the smaller
existing territories as the minimum needed for Congressional
representation.13 To be eligible for a Representative a new territory must
also have a government constituted by Congress, such as through an
Organic Act. This is intended to exclude temporarily-acquired territories
from eligibility.14
The final sentence of paragraph (1) is intended to eliminate any
distinction between state Representatives and those of territories or the

12. Recent presidential musings about buying Greenland notwithstanding! Phillip Inman, Why
does Donald Trump want to buy Greenland?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2019), available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/19/why-does-donald-trump-want-to-buy-greenland
(last accessed Mar. 30, 2022).
13. American Samoa has a population of 55,100 and the Commonwealth of the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: 57,917 (Greenland: 56,973!). United States
Territories 2022, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/countryrankings/united-states-territories (last accessed May 3, 2022); Greenland Population 2022 (Live),
WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/greenland-population (last
accessed May 3, 2022).
14. The requirement that the government be constituted by Congress would arguably exclude
a territory with a status similar to American Samoa, due to its government being constituted by the
executive branch (unless one considers the “by Congress” requirement to be satisfied through the
Senate ratification of the relevant treaty of acquisition). However, it seems inappropriate to anticipate
further territorial acquisitions of this type in the Constitution.
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District. The reference to rules of the House of Representatives is intended
to eliminate the possibility of that chamber using its rule-making authority
under Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution to perpetuate or create
distinctions between state representatives and former delegates.
The qualifications for territorial and district representatives set forth
in paragraph (2) replicate those in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution,
subject to a few changes. The prohibition contained in existing federal
legislation disqualifying territorial delegates who hold other public offices
or are simultaneously candidates for other elective offices have been
replicated for good measure. Though they already exist under federal law,
they should also be constitutionalized for the sake of consistency.15
One diversion from the existing constitutional qualifications for
representatives, however, is needed to address the possibility that the
Representative from American Samoa will be a U.S. national but not a
citizen. The parenthetical language allowing nationality rather than
citizenship to satisfy the qualification achieves that goal.16
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that neither
Congress nor states may impose additional qualifications on their
Representatives,17 the TRDA would ensure this also applies to territorial
governments, as well as to a Congress seeking to exercise its plenary
powers under Article IV, Section 3. There are several reasons for doing
so. First, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, was a 5-4 decision about term
limits, so not necessarily as enduring a constitutional norm as could be
achieved by clear constitutional text. Second, if the Insular Cases stand
for anything it is the proposition that, when given the opportunity,
Congress can and will discriminate against the people of territories. In
point of fact, it is embarrassingly still a requirement of federal law that
Puerto Rico’s resident commissioner to Congress be able to “read and

15. See, e.g. 48 U.S.C. § 1713 (Qualifications for delegates from Guam and U.S. Virgin
Islands); 48 U.S.C. § 1753 (CNMI); 48 U.S.C. § 1753 (American Samoa); 2 USC § 25a (b) (District
of Columbia); 48 U.S.C. § 892 (Puerto Rico).
16. Current federal law addresses the issue by requiring the delegate from American Samoa to
“owe allegiance to the United States.” 48 U.S.C. § 1753. To ensure proper interpretation, this language
has been used together with “national.”
17. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779
(1995).
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write the English language.”18 The amendment would invalidate this
colonial-era requirement.19
Moreover, in other contexts territorial governments have themselves
restricted or sought to restrict political participation based on grounds that
would be patently unconstitutional if attempted by states. Examples
include membership in the American Samoan senate being limited to
hereditary chiefs or matai, and the government of Guam’s understandable
but unsuccessful recent effort to limit voting in future plebiscites on the
island’s political status to “native inhabitants of Guam.”20 The people of
U.S. territories have experienced generations of colonialism with limited
democratic recourse and certain forms of special treatment locally are part
of the original bargain between the territory and the United States; this
article does not intend to challenge this history or the merits of any special
dispensations. Given the overarching principles of equality on which the
Constitution is founded, however, and need for a House of Representatives
that reflects those principles, it should be clear that territorial governments
cannot impose additional qualifications on their representatives beyond
those in the Constitution or be allowed to do so through Congress’ exercise
of its plenary powers.
Paragraph (3) confirms that Territorial and District representatives
shall be elected every two years, just as with state representatives. This
could arguably be left unsaid but given that under current law the Resident
Commissioner for Puerto Rico serves a four-year term, 21 it seems prudent
to eliminate the possibility of ongoing differential treatment through
constitutional language.
The same logic applies to the language in paragraphs (4) and (5)
regarding vacancies. This is intended to ensure that, just as with states,
vacancies in the House of Representatives are filled by elections rather
than appointment. Under current federal law a vacancy in the office of
Resident Commissioner is appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico upon
18. 48 U.S.C. § 892. Of course, it may be perfectly desirable that a legislator be literate in the
language of the legislative body to which they are elected. The point is that this is not an eligibility
requirement that is legally imposed on any other members of Congress.
19. The amendment would also eliminate another quirky qualification requirement currently
applicable only to delegates from the District of Columbia: a three-year continuous residency
requirement. 2 USC § 25a (b)(4).
20. REVISED CONST. AM. SAM., art. II, §3 (“A Senator shall… be the registered matai of a
Samoan family who fulfills his obligations as required by Samoan custom in the county from which
he is elected.”); Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2739 (2020)
(Finding the “native inhabitants of Guam” limitation a “proxy for race” in violation of the 15th
Amendment).
21. 48 U.S.C. § 891.
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the advice and consent of the territory’s senate,22 another divergence from
constitutional norms which should be eliminated by clear text.
Paragraph (4) also includes language intended to ensure that territorial
Representatives represent all the people of their territory by ensuring that
the franchise is not limited on grounds that would otherwise be clearly
unconstitutional but for the territorial context. The basis for this concern
has already been mentioned above in the discussion of qualifications for
Representatives. The reference to “heritage, birth, or manner of acquisition
of United States citizenship” is intended to address attributes that have
been used to discriminate in favor of native inhabitants of territories in
other contexts.23 The appropriateness of such discrimination in other
contexts is not at issue here; the point again being to prevent such
categories being used as the basis of excluding U.S. citizens living in U.S.
territories from participating in the selection of their nation’s leaders based
on attributes they can neither control nor change.
Since Washington D.C. is under the direct jurisdiction of Congress,
paragraph (5) defers to Congress regarding eligibility to vote without
referencing other legislative bodies. It also seems prudent to repeat the
requirement that vacancies be filled by election; silence here could invite
arguments that Congress has the power to (for example) pass legislation
allowing the Speaker of the House or the President to appoint a
replacement.
C. Section 2
Following existing constitutional language, Section 2 establishes that
each territory chooses one elector for the President and Vice-President.
Since there will be only one elector per territory, it seems unnecessary to

22. 48 U.S.C. § 892.
23. See, for example, the Guam Act establishing the Chamorro Land Trust Commission, which
defines “native Chamorro” as “any person who became a U.S. citizen by virtue of the authority and
enactment of the Organic Act of Guam or descendants of such person”—categories based on manner
of acquisition of citizenship or birth. 21 GCA§75101(d). The same law then requires that the Chamorro
Land Trust Commission membership include a certain number of native Chamorro and authorizes it
to lease certain categories of land only to native Chamorro. 21 G.C.A. §75102(a), §75107(a). This
may be reasonable in addressing ancestral lands, but a similarly defined category—native inhabitant
of Guam—was rejected as a proxy for race in Davis, 932 F.3d at 822. The limitation of certain political
positions to those with the hereditary matai status in American Samoa has already been noted. The
constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands prohibits the acquisition of permanent or long-term
interests in land by anyone not “persons of Northern Marianas descent,” which is defined as “a citizen
or national of the United States and who” has at least some degree of Northern Marianas Chamorro or
Northern Marianas Carolinian ancestry, with further detailed provisions addressing the treatment of
persons having only a fraction of the required bloodline. CNMI CONST. art. XII, §§ 1, 4.
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replicate the Twelfth Amendment’s language about electors “meeting in
their respective states.”
Section 2 contains one of the most significant departures from existing
constitutional norms—the constitutionalization of the requirement that
electors be chosen by Territorial voters. This reflects existing practice by
states, but constitutionally states are still (theoretically) free to choose their
electors in other ways.24 Given: (i) Congress’s broad plenary powers over
territories and their governments which, absent constitutional restraint,
could theoretically be used to interfere with the manner in which
Territories choose their electors, and (ii) past and present efforts by some
territorial governments to limit participation by some citizens in various
political processes (as already discussed above), it seems prudent to
specify the manner by which territories choose their electors through
constitutional text.
In a similar vein, the reference to the qualification of voters addresses
the same possibility of territorial legislatures seeking to disenfranchise
certain voters as discussed above. The solution is the same: ensuring
eligibility to vote for Representative renders a voter also eligible to vote
for President and Vice President.
Note that one incidental benefit of the TRDA would be the number of
electors in the electoral college would be increased to 543: the current 538
plus the five additional from the territories. This would (should!) make a
50:50 split electoral vote impossible.
D. Section 3
Section 3 may be controversial in anticipating the possibility of a
territory ceasing to be under U.S. sovereignty. The possibility that some
territories may not be naturally destined for “incorporation” into the
United States as a state is, of course, one of the underlying and problematic
assumptions of the Insular Cases.25 However, in the TRDA the possibility
is anticipated primarily for the benefit of the territories. Insofar as there
are independence movements in some of the territories26 and some
territories have never had referenda on their political status, it seems
appropriate and consistent with U.S. international obligations to at least
address the possibility of independence or other changes in status not

24. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1.
25. See, e.g., DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
26. See, e.g., How Popular Is Independence in Puerto Rico?, P.R. REP. (July 4, 2020),
https://www.puertoricoreport.com/how-popular-is-independence-in-puerto-rico/.
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involving statehood.27 The language is also intended to address possible
concerns in individual territories that constitutionalizing their
Congressional legislation might leave them “trapped” in their current
relationship with the United States. This should not be the case.
Accordingly, the possibility of a departure is acknowledged through
minimalist yet practical language confirming what happens to territorial
Representatives in that event.

E. S ECTION 4
Section 4 sets forth the grant to Congress of legislative authority to
implement the TRDA that has been included in a number of other
amendments, starting with the Thirteenth. Arguably the language may be
unnecessary; there is no need to “enforce” the provisions of this
amendment against state governments, as was the case with the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the amendments relating to voting rights.
Moreover, as has already been explained, Congress already has the ability
to legislate for the territories and the District. Nonetheless, in the interests
of prudence and consistency with the Twenty-third Amendment, which
deals with similar subject matter, the language has been included.

IV. C ONCLUDING R EMARKS
In its proposed form, the TRDA should be viewed as a compromise.
It does not fully address the long history of inequity suffered by U.S.
territories. The reality of constitutional amendments, however, is that they
must be broadly unobjectionable to a large number of Americans to
succeed. The TRDA is thus specifically crafted to advance a completely
reasonable, unobjectionable proposition: that representatives of territories
already sitting in Congress should be treated the same as those of
representatives from states, including for purposes of participating in
presidential elections. Many Americans would likely be surprised to learn
that this is not already the case.
27. According to the United Nations, Guam, American Samoa and the U.S. Virgin Islands are
“Non-Self Governing Territories,” that is, “territories whose people have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government.” U.N. Charter, art. 73. Under Principle VII of UN Resolution 1541 of
1960, G.A. Res. 1541(XV) (Dec. 15, 1960) (“Principles which should guide Members in determining
whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the
Charter”), Non-Self Governing Territories generally escape such status through independence,
integration with an independent state or free association with an independent state. See also, The UN
and Decolonization – Non-Self-Governing Territories, UNITED NATIONS https://www.un.org/dppa/
decolonization/en/nsgt (last accessed June 8, 2021).
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The solution offered by the TDRA is simple: constitutionalize what is
already there. As with all constitutional amendments, making it a reality
will be challenging and entail significant effort and political capital. One
can only hope the legion of politicians, commentators, and activists who
profess concern about voting rights in the fifty states will be made aware
that millions of Americans still effectively have none and be further
motivated to do something about it.
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